UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

7-13-2012

In Re Estate of Wiggins Appellant's Reply Brief
Dckt. 39129

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"In Re Estate of Wiggins Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 39129" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1131.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1131

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
VIVIAN WIGGINS AND EMERSON D.
WIGGINS, DECEASED.

)
)
)

---------------------------------))
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH & WELFARE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
LYNN WIGGINS, personal representative of
THE ESTATE OF VIVIAN WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 39129

--------------------------------)
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, WASHINGTON COUNTY
THE HONORABLE LINDA COPPLE TROUT, PRESIDING

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101
CHIEF, CONTRACTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W DIVISION

R. BRAD MASINGILL
Attorney at Law
27 W. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, ID 83672
ISB No. 2083
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

W. COREY CARTWRIGHT, ISB No. 3361
Deputy Attorney General
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0009
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....................................................

11

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES . ...................................... iv
ARGUMENT ............................................................... . 1

THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE CITES "FACTS" THAT ARE NOT IN THE RECORD .
...................................................................... 1
A.
There Is Nothing in the Record That Suggests the Department "Participated In"
Vivian's Presumed Marriage Settlement Agreement ....................... 1
B.
The Magistrate's Finding That a Marriage Settlement Agreement Existed Is Not an
Issue in this Appeal ................................................ 2
THERE IS NO INCONSISTENCY IN THE RECOVERY OF ASSETS EXCLUDED FOR
ELIGIBILITY. . ......................................................... 3
IDAHO CODE § 56-218 SEEKS RECOVERY FROM ASSETS TRACEABLE TO THE
MEDICAID SPOUSE WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAVE BECOME THE SEPARATE
PROPERTY OF THE SPOUSE. . ........................................... 4
A.
The Department's Rules Protect Property Which Has Always Been the Spouse's
Separate Property .................................................. 4
B.
The Legislative History Cited by the Personal Representative Is Not Inconsistent with
the Department's Rules and Practice ................................... 5
C.
No Further DefInition of the Estate of the Spouse Is Needed ................ 7
If There Is an Absurd Result, it Arises from the Personal Representative's
D.
Interpretation of the Statute .......................................... 8
EACH COURT THAT HAS CONSIDERED THE DEFINITION OF ASSETS IN 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(h)(I), HAS FOUND THE RECOVERY SOUGHT HERE AUTHORIZED BY
FEDERAL LAW ......................................................... 9
A.
The Barg Case Is Not Controlling Here ................................. 9
B.
The Case of Estate of Bruce, Cited by the Personal Representative, Does Not
Support the Personal Representative's Position ......................... 14
C.
The Anti-lien Provision of Section 1396p Doesn't Apply after Death ........ 16
D.
The Expanded DefInition of Estate Is Not Limited to Automatic Transfers .... 16
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST
THE DEPARTMENT.................................................... 17
A.
The Personal Representative Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees under Idaho Code § 12REPL Y BRIEF - ii

Z:IMRCaseslEstate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\WigginsV\Suprerne Court\Reply Briefwpd

B.

117 ............................................................ 17
The Personal Representative Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees under Idaho Code § 12121 ............................................................ 19

CONCLUSION .............................................................. 20

REPLY BRIEF - iii

Z:\MRCaseslEstate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\WigginsV\Supreme Court\Reply Briefwpd

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
CASES

City a/Osburn v. Randel, _

Idaho _,277 P.3d 353 (2012) ......................... 17

Estate a/Hull v. Williams, 126 Idaho 437,885 P.2d 1153 (App. 1994) ................... 16
Gray v. Tri-Way Canst. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 210 P.3d 63 (2009) ................ 12
Idaho Department a/Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998) ... 2,913, 18
In re Estate

0/ Barg, 722 N. W.2d 492 (Minn.App. 2006) .............................. 15

In re Estate o/Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008) ................................. 3,9, 14, 15
In re Estate a/Bruce, 260 S.W.3d 398 (Mo.App. 2008) ............................ 14, 15
In re Estate a/Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000) ......................... 12, 13, 17, 18
Johnson v. Guhl, 166 F.Supp.2d 42 (D. New Jersey, 2001) ......................... 13,14
Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hasp., 147 Idaho 109,206 P.3d 473 (2009) .......... 12
Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch School Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1277 (2010)
.............................. , .......................................... 19,20
Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 172 P.3d 1081 (2007) .......... 17
Smith v. Idaho Dept. a/Labor, 148 Idaho 72, 218 P.3d 1133 (2009) ..................... 18
Smith v. Washington County Idaho, _

P.3d _,2010 WL 3895341 (Idaho, 2010) ........ 20

State Dept. a/Health and Welfare v. Hudelson, 146 Idaho 439, 196 P.3d 905 (2008) ........ 16
State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007) ................................... 12

REPLY BRIEF - iv

Z:\MRCases\EstateIWCCIWCC Open CaseslWigginsV\Supreme Court\Reply Briefwpd

STATUTES

2 U.S.C. § 1396p(h) ................................................... 9, 10, 12-14
42 U.S.C. § 1396p ............................................................ 17
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a) .......................................................... 16
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) .................................................. 15, 17
Idaho Code § 12-117 ....................................................... 17, 18
Idaho Code § 12-121 ....................................................... 19,20
Idaho Code § 15-1-201(16) ...................................................... 8
Idaho Code § 56-218 ...................................................... 5, 6,17
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) ......................................................... 6
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66 ....................... 10-12
OTHER AUTHORITIES

H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 Section 5112 (May 25,1993) ................ 9
Idaho Session Laws 2004, ch. 216, § 1, p. 650 ....................................... 6
IDAPA 16.03.09.905.01 ................................................... 5, 7, 10
IDAPA 16.03.09.905.05 ........................................................ 7
Statement of Purpose, RS 13525 (2004 Legislature) ................................... 6

REPLY BRIEF - v

Z:IMRCaseslEstateIWCCIWCC Open CaseslWigginsVlSupreme Court\Reply Brief.wpd

ARGUMENT

I.
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE CITES "FACTS"
THAT ARE NOT IN THE RECORD.
A.
There Is Nothing in the Record That Suggests the Department "Participated In" Vivian's
Presumed Marriage Settlement Agreement.

In Respondent's Brief, the personal representative repeatedly refers to "facts" that are
completely unsupported in the record. At pages 1 and 2, he states:
The transmutation agreement determined the amount of spend-down required of Vivian
before she could be eligible for Medicaid. Over the course of a year or two after the
transmutation agreement was executed, the Department determined that Vivian had
spent down her resources and because she had no interest in any other property,
including Emerson's, she was granted Medicaid eligibility.

***
The Department, after providing the vehicle for transmutation, seeks to recover
its debt from Emerson's sole and separate property. In fact, the Department
supervised the spend-down of Vivian's only assets in order to make her eligible for
assistance.
Respondent's Brief, pp. 1-2 (underline added). On page 3 the personal representative goes on to say
that the Department describes facts "without mention of the transmutation it participated in, nor the
spend down of Vivian's assets .... " Respondent's Brief, p. 3 (underline added). Likewise, in the first
paragraph on page 4, the personal representative repeatedly refers to the "Department's participation"
in the transmutation of property. Finally, on page 7, he states that the estate funds were "transmuted to
Emerson by the Department and agents." None of these "facts" are true and they are completely
unsupported in the record. There is no evidence the Department had any involvement, much less
supervision, of Vivian's presumed marriage settlement agreement.

REPL Y BRIEF - 1
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Similarly, on page 8 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative makes claims about
what a witness would have, but did not, say, and then proceeds to use that unspoken "fact" to claim:
Given the propensity to lose the written agreements, and the fact that Vivian could not
have become eligible for benefits without one, convinced the Department that indeed
one existed.
Respondent's Brief, p. 8. The Department denies there is a "propensity to lose ... written
agreements," and denies it was "convinced [a marriage settlement agreement] existed." There is
nothing in the record to support such claims.

B.
The Magistrate's Finding That a Marriage Settlement Agreement Existed Is Not an Issue in this
Appeal.
The personal representative claims the Department stipulated to the existence of a marriage
settlement agreement, but then "insisted it had not so stipulated." Respondent's Brief, p. 2. This is not
what happened. At the start of the hearing on the Department's Petition for Allowance of Claim the
Department stipulated that Vivian had been treated as if she had a marriage settlement agreement.
Since Vivian was made eligible in 2003, the marriage settlement agreement, if it existed, would have
been executed about that time. This is as far as the Department was willing to stipulate. The
Department did not stipulate that an agreement actually existed. It is just as possible that the
Department's eligibility personnel had accepted a representation that such an agreement existed, or
would be executed, but the agreement never existed. I
At that point in the proceedings, the Department didn't consider it relevant whether there was a
marriage settlement agreement or not, since it was under the impression the case of Idaho Department

ISee email dated Monday, February 1,2010, referencing caseworker notes where the caseworker assumed
an marriage settlement agreement existed and stated, "HOPE SO ANYWAY." R. p. 215.
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afHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998) had decided the spousal
recovery issue. The briefmg had focused on federal preemption and the case of In re Estate of Barg,
752 N.W.2d 52 (2008). It was a surprise to the Department that Judge Frates later found the
existence of an MSA to be a critical issue and drew broad conclusions from the Department's
stipulation. It was probably an error of counsel to not anticipate this issue and more narrowly tailor the
stipulation.
In any event, the Department has not appealed Judge Frates's findings of fact to this Court and

what mayor may not have been intended by the stipulation is not in issue here.

II.
THERE IS NO INCONSISTENCY IN THE RECOVERY OF
ASSETS EXCLUDED FOR ELIGIBILITY.
The personal representative believes there is an "inherent contradiction" where assets are
permitted to be transferred to the spouse for eligibility purposes, but then, after death, are subject to
estate recovery. He states:
There is an inherent contradiction created by the Department's participation in the
transmutation, only to subsequently "interpret" the statutes and case law as holding that
Emerson's separate property is subject to Medicaid recovery. Because of the
transmutation, which occurred in 2002, the Wiggins did not seek counsel to determine
their legal rights. 2 The Department, however, simply waited until both Emerson and
Vivian died and then came after Emerson's separate property.
Respondent's Brief, p. 4. However, there is nothing inconsistent in this. The limited division of assets,
which is permitted to facilitate eligibility, benefits both spouses. It allows the Medicaid spouse to

2Again,

there is nothing in the record supporting this claim and it is incorrect.
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receive the assistance she needs. It also allows the non-Medicaid spouse the resources necessary to
live in the community. After the death of both spouses - after their needs have been fully met - there is
nothing inconsistent with recovering the couple's assets to reimburse the Medicaid program so the
needs of other needy couples may be met. Indeed, as described in section IV of Appellant's Brief
(beginning at p. 10) this shifting treatment of the couple's assets is exactly what the law intends.

III.
IDAHO CODE § 56-218 SEEKS RECOVERY FROM ASSETS
TRACEABLE TO THE MEDICAID SPOUSE WHETHER OR
NOT THEY HAVE BECOME THE SEPARATE PROPERTY
OF THE SPOUSE.
A.
The Department's Rules Protect Property Which Has Always Been the Spouse's Separate
Property.
The personal representative accuses the Department of changing its position relating to the
spouse's separate property:
The Department's initial position encompasses such situations as occur when
two older folks marry, both having substantial separate property from their former
relationships. The Department's position was such that the subject couple can do
nothing to protect each other's separate property from Medicaid recovery. It is
unconscionable to think that folks who get married the second or third time around,
presumably in their later years, would lose their separate property to Medicaid
recovery provided to a spouse. The statute as applied in the manner originally
demanded by the Department, is overbroad and unconstitutional. State v Bitt, 118
Idaho 584 (1990).

***
The Department in its Appellant's Brief now claims that its recovery can be
limited to "once community property", thus shielding the second marriage example
above from its reach.
Respondent's Brief, pp. 10-11. However, it has always been the Department's position that recovery
is made by tracing the property of the Medicaid spouse, including what had been community property

REPL Y BRIEF - 4
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and other jointly owned assets. See Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance, pp. 3-4 (R.
pp. 29-30); Appellant's Brief (District Court, Sept. 17,2010), p. 6 (R. p. 274); Appellant's Reply
Brief (District Court, Nov. 5,2010), p. 8 (R. p. 359); Tr. (Feb. 8,2011) p. 12,1. 6 to p, 13,1. 25.
This position was made clearly in the Appellant's Reply Brief (Nov. 5,2010) in the District
Court, in which the Department stated:
Contrary to the assertions of the personal representative, the Department does not
recover from property which has always been the separate property of the
non-Medicaid spouse. When a couple marries late in life, bringing their separate
property with them, they are not obligated for the Medicaid debt of the spouse, from
property which they retain as their separate property. That is what IDAP A
16.03.09.900.203 does, it limits the Department's recovery to property which had been
the couple's community property, or the property of the Medicaid recipient.
Appellant's Reply Brief (District Court, Nov. 5, 2010), p. 8 (R. p. 359). Contrary to the argument of
the personal representative, the Department has never sought to recover property that was not
traceable to the Medicaid recipient. 4
B.
The Legislative History Cited by the Personal Representative Is Not Inconsistent with the
Department's Rules and Practice.

At page 10 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative argues that the legislative history
ofIdaho Code § 56-218 shows an intent that recovery be made only from property that was still
community property at the death of the non-Medicaid spouse. The relevant part of the Statement of
Purpose he cites states:

3Now

found at IDAPA 16.03.09.905.01.

4In this case, the personal representative has admitted that the estate funds are traceable to the couple's
community property. At page 7 of Respondent's Briefhe states, "In fact, the funds still in existence are the funds
transmuted to Emerson .... "
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The proposed legislation also makes a technical correction to Idaho Code 56-218 to
clarify that the non-Medicaid spouse of a Medicaid recipient need not survive the
Medicaid recipient in order for the department to file a claim against the community
property of the non-Medicaid spouse's estate.
Statement of Purpose, RS 13525 (2004 Legislature). The legislation the statement of purpose refers to
is S.B. 1290, passed in 2004 (Idaho Session Laws 2004, ch. 216, § 1, p. 650) which added the
discovery exception to the asset transfer provision ofIdaho Code § 56-218. The technical correction
referred to is the following change to the then existing Idaho Code § 56-218(1):
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five
(55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance may be
recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the Stl1 vi ving spouse, if any, for
such aid paid to either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical
assistance correctly paid to the individual may be established against the estate of either
spouse, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the death of the
St11 viving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual has no surviving child
who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c. Transfers ofreal or personal property, on or
after the look-back dates defmed in 42 U.S.C. 1396p, by recipients of such aid, or
their spouses, without adequate consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an
action in the district court.
Idaho Session Laws 2004, ch. 216, § 1, p. 650. In other words, the spousal recovery language was
already present (and indeed had been present since the original version was passed in 1988). The
"technical correction" related to the order of death of the spouses, not what property could be
recovered from the estate of the spouse.
This statutory change dealt with circumstances where the non-Medicaid spouse passed away
first, and the Medicaid spouse survived him. Therefore, the focus was on the recovery of the property
of the non-Medicaid spouse. Recovery would only be made from his assets that had been community
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property, not his assets that had always been his separate property. IDAPA 16.03.09.905.01.
According to the Legislative Services Office, a Statement of Purpose "is a brief explanation, in lay
terms, of what a bill would do or what changes a bill would make to existing law." A Drafting Guide
for Statements of Purpose and Fiscal Notes ~ 1
(http://legislature.idaho.gov/aboutisopdraftingguide.htm). Accordingly, the statement should not be read
as a technical legal statement. It is consistent to read this statement as referring to property that had
been the couple's community property. The reference to the non-Medicaid spouse's community
property was "a brief explanation, in lay terms" to refer to the couple's jointly owned property, as
distinguished from property that had always been his separate property. If there is any ambiguity in the
law as it relates to separate and community property, the Department's longstanding rules currently
found at IDAPA 16.03.09.905.01 and .05 are a much better guide to the intended meaning of the
statute than the "lay terms" statement of purpose.
C.

No Further Definition of the Estate of the Spouse Is Needed.
The personal representative believes a "glaring problem with Idaho Code § 56-218(1) is its

failure to defme the "estate of the spouse." Respondent's Brief, p. 9 (emphasis in original).
However, there doesn't seem any question that Emerson is "the spouse" and the probate code defines
"estate:"
(16) "Estate" means all property of the decedent, inel uding community
property of the surviving spouse subject to administration, property of trusts, and
property of any other person whose affairs are subject to this code as it exists from time
to time during administration.
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Idaho Code § 15-1-201(16). This defInition seems very clear. There is no question that the assets
sought here were within Emerson's estate. Indeed, the Inventory fIled by the personal representative
states as much. R. pp. 22-4.
If There Is an Absurd Result. it Arises from the Personal Representative's Interpretation of the
D.
Statute.
At page 14 of Respondent's Brief the personal representative notes the common rule applied to
the interpretation of ambiguous statutes: "a reviewing court shall not interpret a statute in a manner that
leads to an absurd result." (Citing State v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 535, 224 P.3d 1109, 1124
(2010)). However, the personal representative both contends the "statute is clear and unambiguous"
(Respondent's Brief, p. 15) and does not explain what part of the interpretation suggested by the
Department is absurd. On the other hand, interpreting the federal law as demanded by the personal
representative has perverse consequences. For example, Medicaid payments intended to ease the
burden on elderly couples become, instead, a windfall to their heirs. Unmarried Medicaid recipients are
placed at a disadvantage to married couples because a married Medicaid recipient may pass her
property to her heirs while an unmarried Medicaid recipient's assets must be used to repay Medicaid.
Unsophisticated couples who do not seek legal advice will leave nothing to their heirs, while those who
consult an attorney will convey their assets to the non-Medicaid spouse and entirely avoid recovery.
The arbitrary order of death may determine whether recovery is made or not. s In view of the purpose
of Congress to trace assets, whether or not excluded for eligibility purposes, as explained by the House

SPor example, in this case Emerson died less than two weeks after Vivian. If the order of their deaths were
reversed, there would be little controversy over the Department's recovery since the probate allowances (Idaho
Code § 15-2-401 to 406) and Vivian's intestate share (Idaho Code § 15-2-102) would consume almost all the estate
assets.

REPLY BRIEF - 8
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Budget Committee in Section 5112 ofH.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25,1993)

(quoted at p. 12 of Appellant's Brief), to read the law the way the personal representative demands
could be called "absurd."

IV.
EACH COURT THAT HAS CONSIDERED THE
DEFINITION OF ASSETS IN 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1), HAS
FOUND THE RECOVERY SOUGHT HERE AUTHORIZED
BY FEDERAL LAW.
A.

The Barg Case Is Not Controlling Here.
The personal representative cites Estate ojBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008) and suggests

that Idaho Department ojHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998)
would have been decided differently had the court had the benefit of the Barg decision. Respondent's
Brief, p. 15. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court in the Barg case did not discuss the definition of
"assets" found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, which was central to this court's discussion in Jackman.
In the Jackman case, the court upheld recovery from the estate ofthe non-Medicaid spouse.

Except for the dates, the facts in Jackman are nearly identical to those here. In Jackman the Medicaid
spouse, Hildor, transferred all her property to her spouse, Lionel, by a marriage settlement agreement.
Hildor passed away first and Lionel passed away two weeks later. Jackman was appointed personal
representative of Lionel's estate and the Department filed an estate recovery claim. The personal
representative challenged the Department's claim on numerous grounds including federal preemption.
The court upheld Idaho's spousal recovery law, holding that the expanded definition of estate, together
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with the definition of assets found at 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1 )6, validated recovery of property that
had, at any time after October 1, 1993, been community property.
The Jackman decision must be read carefully because ofthe way it was decided. The final
decision is an edited version, altered on re-hearing, ofthe original decision of the court. It is helpful to
understand the original decision and the reason for the court's alteration on rehearing. In the court's
first decision, the Court held wholly in favor of the Department. Upon Petition for Rehearing, the
Supreme Court modified its decision because the effective date of the federal law on which the Court
had relied in its original opinion was after the date of the couple's marriage settlement agreement. The
court, therefore, held that recovery would be limited to property that had been community property
after the effective date ofthe federal law, "OBRA '93."7
The Magistrate seemed to believe that Jackman held that only property which remains
community property at death is subject to recovery. This is incorrect. If the Magistrate were correct,
the Supreme Court's entire discussion ofOBRA '93 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Pub. L. 103-66) and its effective date, the definition of assets in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) (now
1396p(h)), and the expanded definition of estate, would all be superfluous. The Court could just as
well have said, "since there was a marriage settlement agreement and the property was transferred
before death, there can be no recovery." That is not what the Court did. The discussion of the
effective date ofOBRA '93 is central to the court's holding, and Jackman is an important case

6Then

42 U.s.C. § 1396p(e)(l).

7This limitation is embodied in IDAPA 16.03.09.905.01, limiting spousal recovery to property that had been
community property at any time after October 1, 1993.
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because it demonstrates what Congress did in enacting OBRA '93, and how the outcome of the case
would have been different had the transfer been after the effective date of OBRA '93, as it was in this
case.
The court began with the over-arching holding:
The Department asserts that I.C. § 56-218, as it existed at times applicable to
this case, authorized recovery of the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's
estate. We agree.

Jackman, 132 Idaho at 8, 970 P.2d at 215. The Court then goes on to state that the Department was
preempted from recovering the assets conveyed by the Medicaid recipient to her husband before the
effective date ofOBRA '93. If the Court had believed there could be no recovery of property
transferred before death, it could have simply said that such transferred property was out of the
Department's reach forever. However, the Court went to great pains to discuss the effective date of
OBRA '93 and the effect that date had on its holding. The court discussed the expanded defmition of
estate enacted by OBRA '93 and discussed the federal defmition of "assets." There was no
controversy over the legal effect of the federal definition of "assets." Rather, the court merely
concluded that because the marriage settlement agreement was executed before the effective date of
OBRA '93, the new federal law did not apply to the transferred property:
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the agreement,
which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8, 1993. The definition
of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal statute does not apply
"with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of the enactment of this Act
[Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 13611(e). Therefore, it does not apply to the
agreement and does not allow the Department to recover the balance of the Medicaid
payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true even though 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for calendar quarters
beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the Department to recover
REPLY BRIEF - 11
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the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the definition of "assets"
contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(I), "other assets" are only those included
within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C. § 15-1-201(15). Lionel's separate
property, including the community property transmuted by the agreement, is not part of
Hildor's estate.

Jackman, 132 Idaho at 9-10, 970 P.2d at 216-7 (emphasis added). The obvious and necessary
inference is that with "the definition of 'assets' contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1), 'other assets'"
would include the property transferred by the Medicaid recipient to her husband through the marriage
settlement agreement. Things that are necessarily implied can have legal effect. There can be implied
consent (State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007)), implied authority

(Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hasp., 147 Idaho 109, 112,206 P.3d 473, 476 (2009)),
and implied promises (Gray v. Tri-Way Canst. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 387,210 P.3d 63, 72
(2009)) among other things. There is no need to guess at the meaning ofthe Court here. The Court
was clearly explaining the effect of OBRA '93 when it comes to spousal recovery in Idaho.
Assuming, as we must, that there was a marriage settlement agreement in this case it would
have been post-OBRA '93. Therefore, under Jackman the property of Emerson's estate is subject to
estate recovery.
The same reasoning was used by the North Dakota Supreme Court in In re Estate of Wirtz,
607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000), which cites Jackman:
Our inquiry, therefore, is narrowed to whether Clarence Wirtz had "real and personal
property and other assets in which [he] had any legal title or interest at the time of
death, including such assets conveyed" to Verna Wirtz through "other arrangement."
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1), asset is defined as:
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income and
resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any income
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or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but
does not receive because of action(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal authority to
act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such individual's spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the
direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse.
See Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970
P.2d 6, 9 (Id.1998) (concluding the definition does not apply to assets disposed of on
or before August 10, 1993).
Thus, the department can assert a claim against real or personal property, and
other assets in which Clarence Wirtz had any legal title or other interest at his death,
including income and assets conveyed through "other arrangement."

Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885 (underline added). The North Dakota Supreme Court then went on to
decide what the terms "interest" and "other arrangement" mean in the federal statute and concluded:
We conclude consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light of the
Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a legislative
intention to allow states to trace the assets ofrecipients of medical assistance and
recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse dies.
We hold any assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to Verna Wirtz before
Clarence Wirtz's death and traceable to her estate are subject to the department's
recovery claim. However, the recoverable assets do not include all property ever held
by either party during the marriage. Cf Estate ofJobe, 590 N.W.2d 162, 166
(Minn.Ct.App.1999). 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) contemplates only that assets in which the
deceased recipient once held an interest will be traced. It does not provide that
separately owned assets in the survivor's estate, or assets in which the deceased
recipient never held an interest, are subject to the department's claim for recovery.

Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 886 (italics in original; underline added).
The one other court to actually consider the effect of the definition of assets in 42 U.S.c. §
1396p(h)(1) was a federal district court in New Jersey. In the case of Johnson v. Guhl, 166
F.Supp.2d 42 (D. New Jersey, 2001) the court considered so-called community spouse annuity trusts
and analogized to recovery from the estate of the non-Medicaid spouse:
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Despite the fact that there is no federal law on point with respect to CSATs
similar to the ones at issue here, there are federal provisions that govern the recovery
by the state of Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of a beneficiary. Section 13 96p(b)(1)
allows the states to seek recovery for medical assistance properly paid under a state
plan from the recipient's estate. See id. Section (b)(4) goes on to defme a deceased
individual's "estate" for the purposes of this subsection as follows:
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of an
individual to whom paragraph (1)(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed
to a survivor, heir or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4). Further, section 1936p(e) defines "assets" with respect to
an individual as "all income and resources of the individual and of the individual's
spouse." The corresponding state statutes and regulations essentially mimic the federal
statutes. See N.J.S.A. 30:4D-7.2(a)(1); N.J.S.A. 30:4D-7.2(a)(3); N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.
10(b)(3). Consequently, the federal Medicaid statutory scheme allows for the recovery
of assets from the individual or individual spouses estate. This reading is consistent with
the MCCA, which governs the calculation of a couples resources in order to determine
Medicaid eligibility. See 42 U.S.c. § 1396r-5 et seq.
Johnson v. Guhl, 166 F.Supp.2d at 50 (underline added). Therefore, each court which has actually

considered the definition of "assets" found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p has uniformly upheld recovery from
the estate of the non-Medicaid spouse. Barg, which fails to even consider the definition of "assets" in
section 1396p, is neither helpful nor controlling here.
B.
The Case of Estate of Bruce, Cited by the Personal Representative, Does Not Support the
Personal Representative's Position.
At page 16 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative cites the case of In re Estate of
Bruce, 260 S.W.3d 398 (Mo.App. 2008) and states:
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Barg was quoted in a Missouri case, In re the Estate of Bruce, 260 S.W. 3rd
398 (Mo. App. 2008) in which an award in favor of the State of Missouri was reversed
where tenancy in entirety was involved.
Respondent's Brief, p. 16. However, Bruce was decided before the Barg case discussed here. The
Barg case cited in Bruce was the Minnesota Court of Appeals case, In re Estate of Barg, 722

N.W.2d 492 (Minn.App. 2006), which held in favor of spousal recovery and was cited by the dissent.
Moreover, the Missouri Court of Appeals in Bruce made it quite clear that it only denied spousal
recovery in that case because Missouri had not yet adopted the expanded definition of estate in 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B):
Nor could the State recover from Orville Bruce's estate because the General Assembly
has not taken the step required by Section 13 96p(b)(4)B to adopt a defmition of estate
for the purpose of Medicaid recovery to include such property. For example, the New
Jersey legislature, unlike Missouri, has adopted a definition of estate that includes:
[A]ll real and personal property and other assets included in the recipient's
estate as defined in N.J.S. 3B:l-l, as well as any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the recipient had any legal title or interest at
the time of death, to the extent of that interest, including assets conveyed to a
survivor, heir or assign of the recipient through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.
NJ.Rev.Stat. Section 30:4D-7.2a(3) (1995). Until the General Assembly takes this
step, Missouri's Medicaid program will not be able to recover property possessed by a
successor by virtue of being owned as a tenant by the entirety.
Estate of Bruce, 260 S. W.3d at 403-4 (footnote omitted; underline added). Clearly, Idaho has

already done what the court in Estate ofBruce said was necessary to authorize recovery from the
estate of the spouse. 8

8The dissent in Estate of Bruce agreed that adoption of the expanded definition of estate would authorize
Missouri to recover from the spouse's estate, but believed Missouri law was already sufficiently broad to
encompass that expanded definition. In re Estate of Bruce, 260 S. W.3d 398, 406-17 (Mo.App. 2008). The dissenting
opinion contains a very good history of spousal recovery under the federal Medicaid law.
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C.

The Anti-lien Provision of Section 1396p Doesn't Apply after Death.
At page 15 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative cites State Dept. of Health and

Welfare v. Hudelson, 146 Idaho 439, 196 P.3d 905 (2008) suggesting that the anti-lien provision of
section 1396p militates against recovery here. However, the anti-lien provision clearly applies only
before the death of the Medicaid recipient:
(a) Imposition of lien against property of an individual on account of medical
assistance rendered to him under a State plan
(1) No lien may be imposed against the property of any individual prior to his
death on account of medical assistance paid or to be paid on his behalf under the State
plan ....
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a) (underline added). This is a further example of how the rules applying to a
Medicaid recipient's property change after death.
D.

The Expanded Definition of Estate Is Not Limited to Automatic Transfers.
At page 21 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative contends that the expanded

definition of estate allows recovery only of property that transfers automatically on death. This
distinction, however, is not found anywhere in the law. Even among the listed transfers, not all occur at
the moment of death. For example, when a living trust is created the legal title is passed immediately.

Estate of Hull v. Williams, 126 Idaho 437, 443,885 P.2d 1153, 1159 (App. 1994). The beneficiary
holds only the beneficial, not legal, interest, and no legal interest passes on death.
Section (b)( 4) is written in very broad and expansive terms:
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a
deceased individual(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State pro bate law; and
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(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of an
individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal property
and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death
(to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added).
When this language is read in context with the remainder of the subsection and the definition of
"assets" in subsection (h), it becomes clear. The phrase beginning with "including" shows the breadth
of this section. In case the drafters missed something, they included the words "or other arrangement."
The North Dakota Supreme Court found this language sufficiently expansive to include property such
as that at issue in this case. In re Estate a/Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000).

v.
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IS NOT ENTITLED
TO ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT.
The court reviews the denial of attorney fees below for an abuse of discretion. City 0/ Osburn

v. Randel, _

Idaho _ , 277 P.3d 353 (2012). There was no abuse of discretion in the denial of

attorney fees.

A.

The Personal Representative Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees under Idaho Code § 12-117.
Even if the Court were to fmd in favor of the personal representative in this matter, attorney fees

should not be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-117. As stated by this Court in Ralph Naylor Farms,

LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 809,172 P.3d 1081, 1084 (2007), "if an agency's actions are
based upon a 'reasonable, but erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous statute,' then attorney fees
should not be awarded." The Department's interpretation ofIdaho Code § 56-218 and 42 U.S.C. §
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1396p is entirely reasonable. Moreover, where the issue is a matter of frrst impression, or other states
have conflicting case-law, attorney fees should not be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-117. Smith v.

Idaho Dept. a/Labor, 148 Idaho 72, 76,218 P.3d 1133,1137 (2009). If Jackman does not decide
this issue, then it is one offrrst impression, and the North Dakota Supreme Court, in Wirtz, supports the
Department's position herein.
The personal representative seizes on certain language in Judge Frates's Memorandum
Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate where the Magistrate stated:
A transfer of community property by a Marriage Settlement Agreement is not
an automatic transfer like those specifically listed in 42 U.S.C. 1396(b)(4)(B). Another
remedy for recovery is provided in Idaho Code 56-218(2). The Departments
expansive interpretation to include all transactions is not reasonable.
Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate, p. 6 (R. p. 121). The personal
representative contends that the use of the words "not reasonable" means that attorney fees must be
awarded under Idaho Code § 12-117. The fact that the Magistrate said the "interpretation" was not
reasonable does not mean the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. The
Magistrate explained:
Now, with regard to the claim under Idaho 12-117 and Mr. Masingill again
honed in on the section on the Department's expansive Interpretation to include all
transactions is not reasonable.
Although the Court found that that expansive interpretation was not reasonable,
I don't find that the department's position was unreasonable. I fmd that the definition
that they tried to apply was so expansive that it rendered - it rendered the community
property law as the separate property laws of Idaho marriage settlement agreement
provisions meaningless effectively but I'm going to reserve that issue.
Tr. (April 21, 2010) p. 31, 11. 12-23 (quoted in R. p. 383) (underline added). In his Order on
Attorney Fees, filed June 23,2010 (R. p. 256), the Magistrate further explained:
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The legal basis for the Department's claim was based on an interpretation of an
ambiguous and conflicting set of federal and state laws. This court determined in its
memorandum decision that the interpretation of the law expanding collection from a
spouses separate property to be in contravention of Idaho's community property law
and "was not reasonable". Perhaps the appropriate term should have been "too
expansive" since that interpretation would render Marital Settlement Agreements
recognized by Idaho to be meaningless. The law on this matter is not settled and each
party had a basis to make its arguments. The actions and arguments by the Department
are neither arbitrary nor groundless. The court simply chose the less expansive
interpretation of the law.
Order on Attorney Fees, p. 4 (R. p. 259) (underline added). Therefore, the fact that the magistrate
used the word "unreasonable" does not mean he was required to award attorney fees.
B.

The Personal Representative Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees under Idaho Code § 12-121.
The personal representative claims he is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-

121 "because of the frivolous and unreasonable actions and positions taken by the Department."
Respondent's Brief, p. 24. The Department has acted reasonably and in good faith in every sense in
this matter. 9 However, perhaps more correctly, Idaho Code § 12-121 simply does not apply in this
case. As stated in Potlatch Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlatch School Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 226
P.3d 1277 (2010):
The School District also requests attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121, which
permits fee awards to prevailing parties in "any civil action." This request is denied
because LC. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for the entities
to which it applies. See Westway Canst., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 139 Idaho
107, 116, 73 P.3d 721, 730 (2003) (citing State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners,

9In support of his claim that the Department has acted frivolously, the personal representative again, and
disingenuously, advances the claim the Department somehow failed to notify the court of the decision in the Perry
case. Respondent's Brief, p. 25. This same argument was made to the Magistrate (R. p. 130), and again to the
District Court (R. p. 319). The personal representative, knows, or should know by now, that the Magistrate was
advised of the Perry decision before the Department's counsel even knew of it. See recitation offacts at R. p. 180,
showing that the personal representative had already advised the Magistrate of the decision in Perry before the
Department was even notified.
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Inc., 130 Idaho 718, 723, 947 P.2d 391, 396 (1997» (stating that § 12-117 is the
exclusive basis for seeking attorney fees against a state agency).
Potlatch Educ. Ass'n, 148 Idaho at 635,226 P.3d at 1282 (underline added); accord Smith v.
Washington County Idaho, 150 Idaho 388, 392,247 P.3d 615, 619 (2010). Attorney fees can not
be awarded against the Department under Idaho Code § 12-121.
VI.
CONCLUSION

Idaho Code § 56-218 permits the recovery of the assets of this joint estate whether they are
characterized as community or separate property. The Department's claim should be allowed.
Even if the personal representative should prevail herein, there is no abuse of discretion in the
denial of attorney fees below and no attorney fees should be awarded on appeal.
DATED this

l ~ day of July, 2012,

W.'dgR£Y CARTWRHfHT
Deputy Attorney General
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